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Daniel Gile
March 2009

Gartner Group is a company which provides inter alia ‘briefings’ for corporate executives in matters pertaining to the evolution of Information Technology in the marketplace. Its ‘analysts’, as they are called, often give half-day presentations packed with synopses of market evolution worldwide as well as short-term and medium-term predictions which can only be based on extensive research. I have been interpreting at such briefings for many years and have recently had the opportunity to talk to two of Gartner’s analysts and ask them how they arrived at their analyses and predictions. The answer was that in their case (in their particular field of analysis), most of the information comes from their clients. I asked them whether they conducted questionnaire surveys and then processed them statistically, and they answered that most of the information came from personal talks with the clients and with very little statistical processing, and added that this was not “scientific”.

This was an opportunity to reflect upon traditional classifications of research, including my own as set out in a number of texts in this Research Issues section of this website. The systematic collection of information and its analysis for the purpose of generalizing was clearly an essential part of these analysts’ work, as it is an essential part of naturalistic research in academic research work. What are the core differences, if any, between the research done by these two analysts and empirical research in the academic sense of the term (besides the lack of references to existing theories and previous studies of the same or similar phenomena and besides the fact that their research was not reported in an academic publication or meeting)? To me, the main difference lies perhaps in the fact that the two Gartner analysts did not present the data on which their inferences were based as well as the data collection and processing methods they used and the rationale they followed when making inferences. This would make empirical scientists reject their study as bona fide empirical research. But the same could be said about the type of academic research I have called LAP research in other texts in this Research Issues section over the past few years. Could one therefore say that Gartner research is similar to LAP in academic research? Probably not, because it is not a reflection on phenomena and theories, but rather an exercise focusing on data, with limited aims with respect to generalization. On the other hand, LAP researchers may conduct extensive data collection before producing their analyses. Perhaps within LAP, one could talk about ‘empirical LAP studies’ where much information is collected systematically before reflection is attempted (the information being either data on the object of reflection or information on the existing literature on the object of reflection), and about ‘reflective LAP studies’ where reflection is the main component of the research whereas data collection is more limited and less systematic. Finding a solid categorization system for academic research is a tricky exercise, with many fuzzy boundaries. I find that defining provisional categories is useful as a reference to explain some differences and highlight specific norms, especially when training young researchers, but giving them ‘final’, ‘absolute’ status would be unwise.

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Daniel Gile
January 2008

In the ongoing debate about research paradigms in the TS community, it may be interesting to bring up the case of History. History is classified in the humanities and is perhaps unique among academic disciplines in that its product is often a narrative and/or description of a past event or situation presented in a way which is easy to understand for non-experts. To laypersons, the technical work, and in particular the collection, technical analysis and scientific assessment of data for theory development are totally invisible.

Against this background, it may be worthwhile stressing that history involves exploration of the past centred around targeted (rather than random) collection of evidence which is carefully analyzed and weighed against other available evidence, that it can develop ‘theories’ (or hypotheses, as they could be called in some other disciplines) and then seek evidence which supports them, that on the basis of such evidence, the theories being tested are strengthened or weakened. Historians are also aware that theories based on insufficient or insufficiently solid evidence are provisional and may be changed or abandoned in favour of other theories as further evidence comes in. Such work and such an approach fit rather well into the Popperian cycle of empirical theory-testing which one tends to associate with the natural sciences.

Moreover, though History deals primarily with human behaviour as do the behavioural sciences, the evidence it seeks is of a relatively permanent nature: written records and historical artefacts do get damaged over time, but they are far more stable than many physical, chemical, botanical and other objects and phenomena which natural sciences analyze and measure. Would it not make sense to call History an essentially empirical discipline (though Historians may also want to reflect on historical phenomena more ‘philosophically’ in a LAP-oriented way)? In view of the nature of the evidence sought and used to develop theories, would it be absurd to make a case for the inclusion of this discipline from the Humanities among the ‘harder’ sciences?

These questions are designed to provoke, but ultimately to make a point: if we understand that it is possible to classify a discipline from the Humanities as an empirical discipline, and if this discipline can meet requirements of the ‘Scientific Approach’ whilst using qualitative rather than quantitative research and naturalistic methods rather than experimental methods, isn’t it time we let go of superficial stereotypes of ‘science’ and focus on underlying norms and processes?

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Heidrun Gerzymisch-Arbogast

How about looking at texts and their translations from different perspectives? Like the famous Leibniz example in which wanderers from the four directions of the compass head towards a town and each wanderer sees the same town but (only) from her individual perspective. All are right when they say the town looks this or that way as they see it. But it is only their individual perspective of the town that is seen not the town as a whole.

Isn’t this also true for translated texts? Can texts and their translations not be viewed from different perspectives as well? And shouldn’t our analysis and individual rendering of a text profit from looking at it from different perspectives? Starting from this premise we can think of at least three perspectives (as principles of thought) for  looking at texts but with only their integrated view allowing for an overall understanding (and translation);

(1)   a perspective that views only individual components of a text put together to form the structure of a text, e.g. words like Lego components which form a structure or system,

(2)   a perspective that takes the individual components further into the text and looks at their informational strings or semantic clusters and

(3)   a perspective which looks at holistic ‘Gestalt’ phenomena, implied background knowledge, cultural attitudes and values in a text.

Let us take Eco’s famous ‘coffee example’ in Experiences in translation¹, when he suggests:

Consider these two sentences, one from an Italian novel, the other from an American one: ‘Ordinai un caffé, lo buttai giù in un secondo ed uscii dal bar’ (literally, ‘I ordered a coffee, swilled it down in a second and went out of the bar’); and ‘He spent half an hour with the cup in his hands, sipping his coffee and thinking of Mary‘.
(Eco 2001:18).

Eco argues that culture cannot be translated because

The first sentence can only refer to an Italian coffee and to an Italian bar, since an American coffee cannot be swallowed in a second both because of its quantity and of its temperature. The second sentence cannot refer to an Italian subject (…) because it presupposes a large cup containing what seems like gallons of coffee.
(Eco 2001:18).

As professional translators and translation researchers we could answer that his example can very well be translated – from different perspectives;

(1)   from a componential perspective: we can look at coffee in its substance (as instant coffee and/or espresso)

(2)   from a pattern perspective we can look at the collocation of ‘coffee’ (i.e. ‘swilled it down’ versus ‘sipping his coffee and thinking of Mary’), which would tell us whether to render ‘instant’ or ‘espresso’.

The dimension that Eco probably has in mind though is

(3)   the holistic dimension, i.e. the implied cultural knowledge dimension of how coffee is consumed in different settings and societies reflecting different cultural values.

The holistic perspective is, as we can see, implied but is interrelated with the other perspectives. Our translation therefore, could possibly reflect only one or all three perspectives depending on which perspective is chosen for the individual translator within the framework of a set translation purpose.

There is ample literature on systematically approaching translations by different perspectives, (i.e.the atomistic, hol-atomistic and holistic perspectives and the interrelated translation methods of Aspectra, Holontra and Relatra). This way of looking at translations can be applied to a great variety of text and translation types (literature, bible, music, film, LSP, polysemiotic texts & translations), incorporating such descriptive standards as lexical & syntactic idiosyncrasies, informational development, meaning levels and clusters & coherence, as well as holistic portrayals of background (cultural) knowledge and underlying strata of meaning and sense.

Some recent Publications reflecting different text and translation perspectives in a variety of different text types (literary, bible, LSP, advertising) of translation and interpreting include:

Floros, Georgios (2006): “Towards establishing the Notion of Idioculture in Texts.” In: Heine, Carmen/Schubert, Klaus/Gerzymisch-Arbogast, Heidrun (Hrsg.): Text and Translation: Theory and Methodology. Jahrbuch Übersetzen und Dolmetschen Band 6 2005/06. Tübingen: Narr. 335-347.

Gerzymisch-Arbogast, Heidrun (2004): „Ein Stück Torá in der übersetzungswissen-schaftlichen Diskussion“. In: Krochmalnik, Daniel/Schultz, Magdalena (Hrsg.): Wie gut ist unser Anteil. Gedenkschrift für Yehuda T. Raddday. Heidelberg: Schriftenreihe der Hochschule für Jüdische Studien. Band 6. 37-56.

Gerzymisch-Arbogast, Heidrun (2005a): “That rising corn … ce blé qui lève … die aufgehende Saat… Towards a Common Translation Profile“. In: Katrin Götz/Thomas Herbst (Hrsg.): Translation and translation theory: uni- or bilateral relationship?. ZAA Zeitschrift für Anglistik und Amerikanistik Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann. 117-132.

Gerzymisch-Arbogast, Heidrun (2005b): “Text und Translation“. In: Zybatow, Lew (Hrsg.): Translationswissenschaft im interdisziplinären Dialog. Innsbrucker Ringvorlesungen zur Translationswissenschaft. Band 3. Frankfurt u.a.: Lang. 35-54.

Gerzymisch-Arbogast, Heidrun/Will, Martin (2005c): „Kulturtransfer oder Voice Over: Informationsstrukturen im gedolmetschten Diskurs“. In: Braun, Sabine/Kohn, Kurt (Hrsg.) (2005): Sprache(n) in der Wissensgesellschaft. Proceedings der 34. Jahrestagung der Gesellschaft für Angewandte Linguistik. Frankfurt: Lang. 171-193.

Gerzymisch-Arbogast, Heidrun/Kunold, Jan /Rothfuß-Bastian, Dorothee (2006): “Coherence, Theme Rheme Progression and Isotopy”. In: Heine, Carmen/Schubert, Klaus/Gerzymisch-Arbogast, Heidrun (Hrsg.): Text and Translation: Theory and Methodology. Jahrbuch Übersetzen und Dolmetschen Band 6 2005/06. Tübingen:Narr. 357-378.

Kim, Young-Jin (2005): “Cultural Constellations in Text and Translation”. In: Engberg, Jan/V. Dam, Helle/Gerzymisch-Arbogast, Heidrun: Knowledge Systems in Translation.TTCP Series. Berlin/NewYork: Mouton de Gruyter. 255-273.

Kunold, Jan (2006): „Probleme der Musikübersetzung: Die Musikalische Fokussierung. Am Beispiel der englischen Übersetzung von Schuberts ’Die Schöne Müllerin’. In: Béhar, Pierre/Schneider, Herbert (2006) (Hrsg.): Das Österreichische Lied. Hildesheim: Olms.

Ndeffo, Alexandre (2004): (Bi)kulturelle Texte und ihre Übersetzung. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.

Sunwoo, Min (forthcoming): “Operationalizing the Category of Translation Purpose”. Paper to be presented at the 3rd MuTra Conference LSP Translation Scenarios. Vienna April 30-May 4th, 2007.

Will, Martin (forthcoming): “Knowledge Systems and Terminology Management in Simultaneous Interpretation”. Paper to be presented at the 3rd MuTra Conference LSP Translation Scenarios. Vienna April 30-May 4th, 2007.

[1] Eco, Umberto (1999/2001): Experiences in Translation. Translated by Alastair McEwen. Toronto – Buffolo – London: University of Toronto Press.

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Ubaldo Stecconi

Octber 2, 2006

In the past half century or so, there has been a growing recognition that translation and translating can be serious intellectual pursuits. There has also been a growing dissatisfaction with traditional accounts of translation, such as “replacement of textual material” (Catford 1965: 20) or “a problem in cryptography” (Weaver 1955: 18).

A few decades are a short time in the development of intellectual discourse and translation studies (TS) still lacks a sound and unifying theoretical basis. Naturally, translation scholars are debating such questions as: How will I conduct my research? Which phenomena will count as relevant observations? How will I interpret my findings and for which purpose? These are less methodological issues than epistemological ones.

Why would TS need a sound theoretical basis? Because these questions depend existentially on agreed theoretical conventions (Popper 2002 [1959], eg.: 88–94). Why should this basis be also unifying? Because investigation is always open to inter–subjective scrutiny. The rules of intellectual inquiry are set within a community.

Ironically, TS is traversed by lots of theories: linguistics (general linguistics, discourse analysis, relevance theory, corpus linguistics), game theory, comparative literature, cultural studies, cognitive sciences, and memetics—just to cite the main currents.

Clearly, TS has a problem of quality and ambition, not of quantity. Why did this emerging interdiscipline fail to find consensus on its core questions? Let me explain with an analogy.

Contemporary translation theory looks like a series of travel books. Their authors tell us about Translationland, but always in their terms. Translationlanders’ ways of life are described in detail, but little understood. Some even insists that the future of Translationland depends on the help other countries may provide.

In contrast, we know little of what Translationland’s customs and beliefs mean to its own inhabitants. Native accounts are few and far between, and those we do have rarely go beyond chronicle, description, and think–aloud reports.

Some natives simply reject all theoretical investigations and ask to be left alone with their myths and practices handed down from generation to generation in primitive ways.

In short, Translationland is a developing country. It depends on theoretical imports; its own exports are either exotic curiosities or raw material for more developed processes; and its culture finds it difficult to create an image by and for itself.

This is consistent with the lack of ambition, a fragmented community, and an unstable object of study. If this is the way things really stand, translation scholars cannot sit on their hands, can they.

References

Catford, John Cunnison. 1965. A Linguistic Theory of Translation. An Essay in Applied Linguistics. London: Oxford University Press.

Popper, Karl Raimund Sir. 2002. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Routledge. First English ed.: London: Hutchinson & Co., 1959.

Weaver, Warren. 1955. Translation. In Machine Translation of Languages, edited by W. N. Locke and A. D. Booth. New York: Technology Press of MIT and John Wiley & Sons (1949 memorandum reprinted, quoting a 1947 letter from Weaver to Norbert Wiener).

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 Andrew Chesterman

October 1, 2006

Descriptive Translation Studies aims at more than description. It also looks for explanations which add to our understanding.

Some explanations are interpretive, or metaphorical ones. An unfamiliar phenomenon may be made more understandable if it is compared to, or seen as, a more familiar one. We get some idea of what light is if we see it as particles, or as waves, for instance. Translation has been “seen as” a great many things – and a great many things have also been “seen as” translation”.

The main kind of explanation in science is a causal one. But in the humanities and human sciences our notion of “cause” is a very flexible one, covering all kinds of contextual constraints, background influences and conditioning factors. Some causes can be formulated as “sufficient conditions”: these offer an explanation about why something had to happen. Other causes can be formulated in terms of “necessary conditions”: these explain how something comes to be possible. (Go googling for more on the difference between these kinds of conditions!)  Still other causal factors might be no more than contributory conditions.

Another fundamental distinction is between causal explanations on the one hand and teleological ones on the other. Teleological explanations appeal to intentions, goals and purposes, rather than antecedent conditions. Skopos theory is a good example.

A generalization can also be a form of explanation. Suppose I notice some shifts of a certain kind in a set of translations. Then suppose that I also read that someone has found the same shifts in other data, other text types, other language pairs. In this case, I am less surprised at what I find in my initial data, i.e. I understand (to some extent) why the shifts are there: they are there “because” there is a general tendency for translations to manifest these shifts. The translators of my data made these decisions “because” all (most / many) translators do. The explanation-seeking question then is no longer “why did my translators do this?” but moves up to a higher level: “why do translators in general tend to do this?” And we might then begin to wonder about cognitive constraints, and so on. The more general the generalizations become, the more explanatory they become. In this way, research on (potential) translation universals can also offer explanations of translation phenomena. (See Croft 1990/2003.)

A third kind of explanation, one which has been receiving increasing attention in the philosophy of science, is known as unification. This means explaining via contextualizing. It works by showing how the explanandum (that which is to be explained) fits into a wider pattern of phenomena. This form of explanation highlights the value of a holistic view which, by showing relevant connections with other phenomena, reduces the number of assumptions we need in order to understand our explanandum. (See e.g. Salmon 1998.)

In order to better understand complex phenomena, we might well need multiple explanations, and also more than one kind of explanation. We can make our explanations more powerful by making them more general, covering more relations and more factors, and perhaps also by relating the explanations themselves to other kinds of explanations. But explanations are seldom final: we can always increase our understanding.

References

Croft, William 1990. Typology and Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Second edition 2003.)

Salmon, Wesley C. 1998. Causality and Explanation. New York: OUP.

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